The study of optimal long-term care (LTC) social insurance is generally carried out under the utilitarian social criterion, which penalizes individuals who have a lower capacity to convert resources into well-being, such as dependent elderly individuals or prematurely dead individuals. This paper revisits the design of optimal LTC insurance while adopting the ex post egalitarian social criterion, which gives priority to the worst-off in realized terms (i.e. once the state of nature has been revealed).
We conduct a stated-choice experiment to analyze the decision to contribute to front- or back-loaded tax-sheltered savings accounts. Our experimental design includes a randomized financial education treatment that provides information on the two types of accounts. We assess whether respondents learn about the tax implications of these accounts, and whether they make better contribution choices when exposed to the financial education intervention.
Using longitudinal medico-administrative data on hospital health costs and stays in Quebec between 1995 and 2012, we performed a decomposition of the variation in costs in order to analyze its main determinants. Over the period analyzed, the share of hospital stays accounted for 86% of the increase in hospital costs, compared to 14% for fee-for-service medical services. From 2008 to 2012, this distribution was 41% and 59%, respectively; the sharp rise in the cost of medical services has thus largely contributed to the rise in hospital costs.